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THE PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS:  IS THE 
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BIOTECHNOLOGY 
DIRECTIVE’S MORAL EXCLUSION CLAUSE UNDERMINING INVESTOR 
CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE, PROVIDING A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE TO THE 
UNITED STATES? 
Stephen R. Donnelly* 
INTRODUCTION 
The original justification for Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (the 
Directive)1 was to promote the growth of the European life science sector by 
harmonizing and clarifying European biotechnology patent laws.2 As early as 1985, the 
European Commission had identified the fragmentation of European patent laws as a 
potential problem.3 The Directive thus aimed to address obstacles to the unity of the 
internal market, which would arise if national Member States adopted divergent and 
uncoordinated policies and legislation in a field of economic activity that had been 
earmarked as poised for spectacular growth.4 The Commission further identified the lack 
of guidance within the European Patent Convention 1973 (EPC)5 on how its provisions 
were to be applied to biotechnological inventions meant that researchers were unsure if 
their work could be legally protected within Europe.6  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Stephen R. Donnelly graduated from Griffith College Dublin with an LL.B (Hons) achieving a
First Class Honours in Intellectual Property. He also holds an LL.M in Commercial Law from 
University College Dublin where he specialised in Intellectual Property and Information 
Technology Law. 
1 EC, Commission Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998, [1998] OJ, L 213/13. 
2 A Plomer & P Torremans, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European Law and Ethics (New York: 
Oxford Unversity Press, 2009) at xxxvii. 
3 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM (85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. 
4 R Gold & A Gallochat, The European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions: History, Implementation and Lessons for Canada (2001). 
5 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by Decision of the 
Administration Council of the EPO Dec 21, 1978, 13 ILM. 268 (1974).  
6 G Laurie, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property: A Marriage of Inconvenience? in S McLean, 
ed, Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics (London: Dartmouth Publishing Group, 
1996) at 237-67. 
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The Commissions concerns were lent greater political urgency by three significant 
events7 that combined to establish the dominance of the United States (U.S.) 
biotechnology industry.8 First, biology researchers in the U.S. were increasingly 
developing new techniques that had substantial commercial application. Second, the U.S. 
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to promote greater 
uniformity in the application of patent law and to reduce the possibility of forum 
shopping by parties seeking favorable courts.9 Thirdly, the landmark Supreme Court 
ruling in Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Chakrabarty,10 took an 
important step towards patent liberalization by stating that living matter was not 
excluded as a ‘product of nature’ and that patents shall be available for ‘anything under 
the sun made by man’.11 It was not long after the Chakrabarty decision that the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began issuing patents on gene fragments, 
transgenic bacteria, and cell lines expressing DNA sequences producing therapeutically 
useful proteins.12 A trend had been for European companies to move their biotechnology 
research from the European Union (EU) to the U.S. because they regarded the 
commercial and legal climate there as more encouraging.13 The Commission concluded 
that European biotechnology patent laws should be clarified and harmonized in order to 
provide the incentives and legal certainty required for the biotechnology industry to 
flourish.14  
 
Given the nature of the objectives pursued, one might have expected that the drafting of 
the Directive would be a relatively straightforward administrative exercise in 
harmonizing the legal criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application in the 
context of biotechnological inventions. Indeed, the first draft of the Directive15 framed 
the problem solely in these terms with the legal standards proposed largely reflecting the 
more permissive approach of the USPTO.16 The project soon ran into difficulties.17 
 
The Directive differs in a key way from the approach of the U.S., as it establishes a 
prominent role for ‘morality’ as an evaluative criterion within European patent law.18 
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7 K Sibley, The Law and Strategy of Biotechnology Patents, (New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 
1994) at 1. 
8 G Porter, The Drafting History of the European Biotechnology Directive, in A Plomer & P 
Torremans, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European Law and Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) at 8. 
9 O Mills, Biotechnological Inventions: Moral Restraints & Patent Law (Wiltshire: Ashgate, 2010) 
at 45. 
10 Trademarks v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980). 
11 G Porter, supra note 8 at 8-9. 
12 L Demaine & A Fellmeth, “Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious 
Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent” (2002) 55:2 Stan L Rev 303 at 319. 
13 S Thaker, The Criticality of Non-Market Strategies: The European Biotechnology Patents 
Directive, online: Northwestern Kellogg School 
<http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/biotech/faculty/articles/shail.pdf>. 
14 G Porter, supra note 8 at 9. 
15 COM (88) 496, 1988 OJ C10/3. 
16 G Porter, supra note 8 at 10. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at 5. 
Vol 20 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 153 
This unique stance emerged during extensive discussions between the Parliament, the 
Commission, and the Council, and was a political concession to the view expressed by 
the Parliament that the patenting of biological materials, in particular those of human 
origin, raises important ethical and social concerns.19 Attempts to address these anxieties 
resulted, inter alia, in the inclusion of a ‘morality clause’ in Article 6 of the Directive.20 
Article 6(1) provides that inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their 
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. Article 6(2), 
intended to clarify how the general morality exclusion in Article 6(1) should be applied, 
contains a list of specific examples of biotechnology inventions that are excluded from 
patentability on moral grounds.21 Ironically, it has been Article 6(2) that has been the 
source of great uncertainties in the years since the Directive was enacted.22 In particular, 
questions regarding how Article 6(2)(c), which excludes ‘uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes’ from patentability, should be applied in relation to 
patent applications for inventions concerning human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) have 
given rise to long-running legal, ethical, and policy debates.23 The debate revolves 
around the fact that Article 6(2)(c) is silent with regard to hESCs.24 This is because the 
first ever isolation of hESCs from an embryo was reported four months after the 
adoption of the Directive.25  
 
Although the Directive was ‘addressed’ only to EU Member States,26 the European 
Patent Office (EPO), which is independent of the EU, voluntarily incorporated the 
Directive’s rules within the EPC.27 Thus moral exclusions are now a fixture of European 
patent law.28 Most patents in Europe are granted via the EPO; however, European 
patents must still be enforced in individual Member States who may interpret the 
Directive differently.29 Whereas the EPO has not granted any patents on hESC claims, 
an overview of EU Member States interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) reveals a patchwork 
of permissive and restrictive regulatory policies towards the patentability of hESCs. In 
contrast to Europe, U.S. patent law contains no statutory basis for the USPTO or a court 
to deny patent protection to morally controversial biotech subject matter. The U.S. has 
adopted probably the most liberal patenting policies on stem cell research, with the 
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19 R Gold & A Gallochat, “The European Biotech Directive: Past as Prologue” (2001) 7(3) Eur LJ 
331 at 332. 
20 L Bently & B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 
454. 
21 G Bahadur & M Morrison, “Patenting human pluripotent cells: balancing commercial, academic 
and ethical interests”  (2009) Human Reproductions 1-8. 
22 G Porter, supra note 8 at 5. 
23 G Laurie, “Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin” (2004) EIPR 59. 
24 H MacQueen et al., Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008) at 501 
25 G Porter et al, “The Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells in Europe (2006) 26:6 
Nature Biotechnology 653. 
26 EC, Commission Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 [1998] OJ L213/13 at art 18. 
27 (1999) OJ EPO 437; (1999) OJ EPO 574. 
28 G Porter et al, supra note 25. 
29 D Rickard & C Murphy, End muddle over stem cell patents or U.S. will race ahead, Times 
Online, 9 July 2009. Online: Timesonline 
 <http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article6667637.ece>. 
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USPTO granting in excess of forty-one patents that claim hESCs in their title and front 
pages.30  
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the inconsistent application of the EU 
Biotechnology Directive’s moral exclusion clause could undermine investor confidence 
in Europe, providing a competitive advantage to the U.S.31  
 
Understanding the science is essential for engaging in knowledgeable debate about the 
ethical issues surrounding hESCs.32 Part II provides an analysis of the biology that 
underpins the human embryo setting out the crucial distinction between totipotent and 
pluripotent hESCs.33 In Part III our attention turns to pre Directive jurisprudence under 
Article 53(a) EPC, where the EPO showed a willingness to interpret the moral exclusion 
clause in a narrow manner that afforded patent protection to controversial biotechnology 
inventions. It was against the EPC framework and the jurisprudence emerging from the 
EPO that the Commission conceived the need for European biotechnology patent laws to 
be clarified and harmonized. Part IV charts the troublesome enactment and transposition 
of the Biotechnology Directive that exposed inherent European conflicts regarding 
patent protection for biotechnological inventions concerning ‘living matter’ of human 
origin. In Part V our focus turns to the subsequent emergence of hESC technology, 
providing an analysis of the post Directive EPO decision in Edinburgh Patent34 which 
set a precedent for the recent decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF)35 where the EPO moved away from its pre Directive narrow approach 
embracing a broad interpretation of the moral exclusion clause setting out a restrictive 
policy on the patentability of hESCs. Part VI analyses the patentability of hESCs at the 
national level, comparing the relatively permissive United Kingdom (UK) and Swedish 
regulatory approaches to the more restrictive German regime, a comparison that raises 
interesting questions as to the legal certainty of biotechnology inventions claiming 
hESCs within Europe. In Part VII our attention turns to the patentability of hESCs in the 
U.S. This section of the paper begins with an analysis of the Constitutional basis of U.S. 
patent law prior to setting out the link between ‘utility’ and ‘morality’ in U.S. patent law. 
Part VII then considers the liberation of U.S. patent law, the application of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to biotechnological inventions, along with the rejection of the doctrine of 
moral utility before finally examining the recent full frontal attack on biotechnology 







30 G Porter et al, supra note 25. 
31 D Rickard & C Murphy, supra note 29. 
32 L Gruen et al, Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues (London: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 
2007) at 3. 
33 G Van Overwalle, “Study on the Patenting of Inventions related to Human Stem Cell Research” 
(2002) European Communities at 218. 
34 Commonly used name for European Patent No 0695351. 
35 G2/06 25 November 2008. 
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I. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS – THE SCIENCE 
 
When human life begins with the union of the sperm and egg, there is but one cell: the 
zygote. Over a matter of hours this cell divides and divides again and at this stage the 
cells that are created have no dedicated function they are said to be undifferentiated.36 
Within this initial period, lasting no more than 3-4 days, these undifferentiated hESCs 
are totipotent, each having the capacity to become a complete and separate embryo.37 
Therefore, totipotent hESCs have the potential to develop into an entire human body.38 
By days 5-7 the organism has become a blastocyst, a ball of around 100 cells each of 
which is now pluripotent, that is, each has the capacity to develop into any of the 200 
cells types that make up the human body, for example heart muscle cells39 and possibly 
even organs in due course,40 but it is no longer possible for them to develop into separate 
embryos or an entire human body.41  
 
The patenting of hESCs is highly ethically contentious, as it involves the destruction of 
viable human embryos in the process of the extraction of hESCs from the inner cell mass 
of the early stage blastocyst.42 Many believe that the human embryo, from the moment 
of fertilization, should be protected as a full grown human being or at least merits respect 
incompatible with its use as a mere means to obtaining stem cells.43 In their opinion, 
killing embryos for stem cells can never be justified, even if this would save or improve 
the lives of millions of people.44  
 
The utilitarian approach argues there are no principled reasons not to produce, destroy, 
and use embryos for research and therapeutic purposes were such destruction benefits 
man kind.45 The most high profile and widely anticipated use of hESCs is the creation of 
therapeutic products to treat a range of serious and debilitating medical conditions 
caused by cell damage; including spinal cord injury, heart disease, and neurological 
disorders such as Parkinson’s disease and Alzheimer’s disease. This would be achieved 
by generating replacement cells or tissues and injecting them into damaged areas within 
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36 G Laurie, supra note 23 at 3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 R Fitt, “New guidance on the patentability of embryonic stem cell patents in Europe” (2009) 
27:4 Nature Biotechnology 338. 
39 Marquis, The Moral-Principle Objection to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in L Gruen 
et al, eds, Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues (London: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2007) at 
51. 
40 A Agovic, “Stem Cell Patents on a Knife Edge” (2008) 3:11 Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law and Practice 718. 
41 G Laurie, supra note 23 at 3. 
42 G Porter, supra note 8 at 5. 
43 Devolder and Ward, Rescuing Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: The Possibility of 
Embryo Reconstitution After Stem Cell Derivation, in L Gruen et al, eds, Stem Cell Research: The 
Ethical Issues (London: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2007) at 105. 
44 Ibid. 
45 T Tannsjo, Why No Compromise is Possible, in L Gruen et al, eds, Stem Cell Research: The 
Ethical Issues (London: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2007) at 189. 
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the body. Although much work remains to be done to demonstrate both the safety46 and 
effectiveness47 of therapeutic stem cell technology, hESCs have become a source of 
hope for the sufferers of serious illness and injury around the world.48  
 
Sales of commercial stem cells products were projected to reach US$ 87 million in 2008 
soaring to US$ 8.5 billion within a decade. Due to profound investments poured into 
hESC research, stem cell technology is heavily reliant on patent protection.49 However, 
the first controversial biotechnological inventions concerning ‘living matter’ that came 
before the EPO, under the moral exclusion clause in Article 53(a) EPC, did not concern 
hESCs, they concerned the patenting of animals, plants, and human tissue.  
 
 
II. PRE-DIRECTIVE MORAL EXCLUSIONS UNDER ARTICLE 53(A) EPC 
 
The EPC 1973 is an international treaty in force since 1977. The concept of a ‘European 
patent’, really only a bundle of national patents, predominates by virtue of the EPC. The 
EPC established the EPO, and also sets out the substantive law on patentability and 
exclusions in all EPC signatory states.50 Neither the EPO nor the provisions of the EPC 
require Member States to bring their national patent laws and practice into conformity 
with the EPC, but most of the Member States have actually amended their laws to 
achieve such conformity, and national patent authorities follow the case law of the 
EPO.51 This represents ‘cold harmonization’.52 The EPC is not an instrument of EU law. 
The EPO is therefore not an organ of the EU, and the EU institutions have no 
jurisdiction over the EPC. 
 
The Guidelines for Examination first published by the EPO in 197753 outline the policy 
underlying the interpretation of the moral exclusion clause under Article 53(a) EPC. The 
Guidelines state that the purpose of the exclusion is to prevent the patenting of 
inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder or to lead to criminal or other generally 
offensive behavior. It is to be invoked only in rare and extreme circumstances. The 
Guidelines suggest ‘a fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the 
public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent 
rights would be inconceivable’.54 The EPC, however, was not drafted with the special 
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46 M Baker, ‘Unregulated Stem Cell Transplant Causes Tumors’ (2009), online: Nature Reports 
<http://www.nature.com/stemcells/2009/0902/090226/full/stemcells.2009.32.html>. 
47 “A Stem Cell Therapy Fails to Help After Heart Attack” International Herald Tribune, 2 March 
2006; Zohlnhofer et al, eds, “Stem Cell Mobilization by Granulocyte Colony-Stimulating Factor in 
Patients with acute Myocardial Infarction: A Randomized Controlled Trial” (2006) 295:9 JAMA 
1003.  
48 G Porter, supra note 8 at 5. 
49 A Agovic, supra note 40 at 718. 
50 The EPC has 36 signatories compared to the EU’s 27 Member States.  
51 A Hellstadius, A Comparative Analysis of the National Implementation of the Directive’s 
Morality Clause, in A Plomer & P Torremans, eds, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European Law 
and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 118. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Guidelines for Examination 1977, updated in 2007. 
54 R Clark & S Smyth, Intellectual Property Law in Ireland (Dublin: Tottel, 2005) at 54. 
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characteristics of biotechnological research and inventions in mind.55 Biotechnology 
presented the EPO with a set of problems with which they are uncomfortable.56 The 
early jurisprudence, however, shows a willingness by the EPO to interpret Article 53(a) 




The role of the morality exclusion under the Article 53(a) EPC was first considered in 
the notorious 1989 Harvard/Onco-Mouse58 decision.59 The case concerned the 
patentability of mice that had been genetically modified so that they would develop 
cancer: a result that the applicants hoped would be useful in cancer research.60 The 
Examining Division of the EPO initially rejected the applicant’s patent application 
stating patent law, and Article 53(a) in particular, was not the correct legislative tool for 
regulating problems arising in connection with genetic modification of organisms.61 On 
appeal, the Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) disagreed with the Examining Division, 
stating in a case like this there were compelling reasons why the implications of Article 
53(a) should be considered such as the interests in remedying human diseases, avoiding 
animal suffering, and environmental concerns.  
 
The TBA, referring to its previous jurisprudence in Lubrizol/Hybrid Plants,62 held ‘any 
exception (to patentability) under Article 53(a) EPC must be narrowly construed’. Under 
a utilitarian balancing of risks and benefits the TBA explained that the Onco-Mouse’s 
purposes of facilitating cancer research was of great importance for human health and 
welfare, and the benefits outweighed the adverse consequences of the invention.63 The 
Examining Division,64 directed to do so by the TBA, concluded that the invention could 
not be considered immoral so as to preclude it from patentability by virtue of Article 
53(a). However, the Examining Division stressed that the considerations outlined applied 
solely to the present case.65 The balancing test in Onco-Mouse provides an example of 
‘asking questions first, patenting later’. One problem with the test is that the Examining 
Division never defined morality nor stated a rational basis for choosing those particular 
factors to balance as opposed to other possible concerns.66 Nevertheless, the test does 
provide the EPO with a mechanism for evaluating the patent eligibility of morally 
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55 O Mills, supra note 9 at 82. 
56 M Bagley, “A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in Biotechnology Patent Law” (2007) 
57 University of Virginia L S 331. 
57 O Mills, supra note 9 at 82. 
58 Harvard/Onco-Mouse, [1990] EPOR 4. 
59 V Vossius, “Patent Protection for Animals” (1990) EIPR 250. 
60 L Bently & B Sherman, supra note 20 at 455. 
61 O Mills, supra note 9 at 57. 
62 Lubrizol/Hybrid Plants, T320/87, [1990] EPOR 173. 
63 G Porter, supra note 8 at 12. 
64 T19/90, [1990] EPOR 501. 
65 O Mills, supra note 9 at 59. 
66 H Jaenichen & A Schrell, “The ‘Harvard Onco-Mouse’ in the Opposition Proceedings Before 
the European Patent Office” (1993) 15 EIPR 345. 
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controversial biotech inventions under Article 53(a) before granting a patent. In two later 
cases, the EPO articulated two additional morality tests.67 
 
ii. Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace 
 
In Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace,68 Greenpeace objected to a patent that had been 
granted for a genetically engineered plant on the grounds that it was inherently immoral 
and created risks to the environment.69 The Opposition Division rejected the opposition 
and Greenpeace then appealed to the TBA.70 In framing the nature of the morality 
inquiry under Article 53(a), the TBA looked to the intent of the drafters of the EPC, as 
evidenced by historical documents, and explained:  
 
The concept of morality is related to the belief that some behavior is 
right and acceptable whereas other behavior is wrong, this belief being 
founded on the totality of the accepted norms, which are deeply rooted 
in a particular culture. For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in 
question is…European society and civilization. Accordingly, under 
Article 53(a) EPC, inventions the exploitation of which is not in 
conformity with the conventionally accepted standards of conduct 
pertaining to this culture are to be excluded from patentability as being 
contrary to morality.71 
 
The Board concluded that none of the claims in the patent violated the morality 
provision of Article 53(a) because they concerned ‘activities and products which cannot 
be considered to be wrong as such in the light of conventionally accepted standards of 
conduct of European culture.’ In other words, the Board ignored the more fundamental 
concerns regarding the patent’s subject matter and focused narrowly on the general types 
of products and activities the patent concerned. This narrow focus allowed the Board to 
avoid broader concerns and tied patentability to the ‘public acceptability’ of the general 
categories of patentable subject matter.72 
 
In reaching its decision, the Opposition Division expressly declined to employ the 
balancing test used in the Harvard/Onco-Mouse decision, noting that it ‘(was) not the 
only way of assessing patentability’ under Article 53(a) but was ‘just one possible way, 
perhaps useful in situations in which an actual damage (e.g., suffering of 
animals)…exists.’73 This ‘unacceptability’ standard is certainly a lower hurdle for an 
invention to overcome than the Harvard/Onco-Mouse balancing test, because balancing 
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67 M Bagley, supra note 56 at 332. 
68 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace, T 356/93 EPO, TBA (1995), EP No87400141, [1995] 
EPOR 357, [1995] OJ EPO 545. 
69 L Bently & B Sherman, supra note 20 at 456. 
70 O Mills, supra note 9 at 65. 
71 Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 68 at 373. 
72 M Bagley, supra note 56 at 332. 
73 Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 68 at 373. 
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does not even come into play unless concrete societal disadvantages of the invention are 
presented.74 
 
A criticism of the EPO ruling in Plant Genetic Systems lies in the fact that there is scant 
evidence suggesting a culture inherent in European society. If there were such a culture, 
Article 53(a) second half sentence, namely, that relating to law and regulation in some or 
all of the Contracting States would be redundant. This part of Article 53(a) is an 
acknowledgement that behavior acceptable in some Member States can be unacceptable 
in others.75 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) has 
stated that ‘Pluralism may be seen as a characteristic of the EU’ and ‘respect for diverse 
national culture is essential to the building of Europe.’76 
 
iii. Howard Florey/H2 Relaxin 
  
The third test for patentability under Article 53(a) EPC was set out in Howard Florey/H2 
Relaxin.77 The application was for a patent for the DNA sequences of a naturally 
occurring substance that relaxes the uterus during childbirth, which is obtained from the 
human ovary.78 Several groups filed an opposition to the issuance of the patent on the 
basis that the patent offended Article 53(a) because, among other things, it covered the 
patenting of human genes and involved taking tissue from a pregnant woman, thus 
offending human dignity. The EPO Board disagreed and articulated the ‘public 
abhorrence’ test for exclusion under Article 53(a):  
 
A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the public 
in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of 
patent rights would be inconceivable. If it is clear that this is the case, 
objection should be raised under Article 53(a); otherwise not.  
  
According to the Opposition Division, it would be abhorrent to the overwhelming 
majority of the public if the invention involved the patenting of human life, an abuse of 
pregnant women, or a return to slavery. The EPO noted that the tissue used in the 
research was donated during the course of necessary gynecological operations and thus 
had not offended ‘human dignity’. Moreover, the Opposition Division stated that the 
argument that the applicant was ‘patenting life’ was misconceived, as DNA, once 
extracted and treated, was characterized not as ‘life’, but as a substance carrying genetic 
information, which can be used to produce proteins that are medically useful.79  
 
Finally, the Opposition Division rejected the assertion that such patenting was equivalent 
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74 M Bagley, supra note 56 at 333. 
75 O Mills, supra note 9 at 66. 
76 Opinion 12 –Ethical aspects of research involving the use of human embryo in the context of the 
5th Framework Programme, online: European Union 
<http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/avis12_en.pdf>. 
77 Howard Florey/H2 Relaxin App. No. 83307553.4, [1995] EPOR 541. 
78 L Bently & B Sherman, supra note 20 at 456. 
79 W Cornish & D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (London: Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, 2007) at 884. 
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to slavery on the ground that such an assertion misunderstood the nature of a patent. This 
was because a patent does not give the proprietor any rights over a human being; all a 
patent monopoly provides is the right to prevent someone from practicing the same 
invention.80 The significance of permitting the patent meant that the Opposition Division 
condoned the commercialization of human genes under the EPC.81 The decision also 
provides guidance for future cases as to what constitutes an abhorrent invention 
precluded from patentability.82  
 
The ‘public abhorrence’ test thus presents an even lower hurdle for a morally 
controversial invention to overcome since fewer inventions are likely to be deemed 
‘abhorrent’ to society than simply ‘unacceptable’ to society. Importantly, none of the 
three tests requires the exclusion of patentability to be tied to a ban on the commercial 
exploitation of the invention.83 It was against the EPC framework, and the confusing 
jurisprudence relating to the legal protection of biological inventions emerging from the 
EPO, that the Commission conceived the need for further patent law harmonization.84 
 
 
III. ADOPTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY DIRECTIVE 
 
The Biotechnology Directive, first proposed by the Commission in 1988,85 turned out to 
be one of the most heavily lobbied and controversial pieces of legislation ever produced 
through the European democratic process.86 As early as 1989, the Parliament took the 
view that the Directive, whose original version did not contain a specific morality 
clause,87 would need to pay greater attention to the moral aspects of biotechnology 
patenting.88 Thus in stark contrast to the comparatively uncontroversial extension of 
patent protection to biotechnological inventions in the U.S., questions of morality 
provided a central point of reference for debates on the acceptable limits of patent law in 
Europe.89 The Directive’s adoption, in 1998, came after ten years of difficult 
negotiations, and followed the Parliament’s rejection of an earlier draft in March 2005.90 
 
In essence, the Directive establishes a harmonized framework for the patentability of 
biotechnological products and processes throughout Europe. It clarifies that in 
accordance with the general principles of patent law, intellectual property protection will 
be available for biotechnological inventions that satisfy the requirements of novelty, 
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inventive step, and industrial application. Further guidance is given on the legal 
distinction between a non-patentable ‘discovery’ and a patentable ‘invention’.91 The 
Directive was ‘addressed’ only to EU Member States,92 obliging them to amend their 
national biotechnology patent laws in order to comply with the Directive by the deadline 
of 30 July 2000.93 The EPO voluntarily incorporated the Directive’s rules within the 
EPC in June 1999 via the insertion of a new Chapter VI, Article 53(a) of the EPC,94 
entitled ‘Biotechnological Inventions’, into Part II of the EPC Implementing 
Regulations.95 The incorporation of the Directive rules within the EPC was to ensure 
consistency of approach as between EU Member States and the EPO. Article 6(2)(c) of 
the Directive was transposed as Rule 23d(c) EPC (now Rule 28(c) EPC 2000).96  
 
The EPO began examining and granting patents in accordance with the principles set out 
by the Directive when the new provisions entered into force on 1 September 1999.97 The 
EPO’s willingness to transpose the provisions of the Directive was not shared by all EU 
Member States. Even after the adoption of the Directive in 1998, the compromise that 
was eventually brokered was still not acceptable to all countries.98 Due to the strong and 
diverging opinions surrounding the ‘patents of life’ issue, the process of implementation 
was severely protracted in many Member States.99 Several EU Member States defied EU 
law by failing to create national laws to implement the Directive by the deadline.100 In 
the Council, the Netherlands, who refused to apply patent law to living biotechnological 
material,101 had voted against the Directive, and Belgium and Italy had abstained.102 
Upon enactment the legality of the Directive was immediately challenged by the 
Member States before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ). 
 
i. Netherlands v Parliament and Council 
 
In The Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council103 the 
government of the Netherlands, joined by Italy and Norway, sought to annul the 
Directive in its entirety. The Netherlands put forward six arguments, namely that Article 
100(a) of the EC Treaty was the incorrect legal basis for the Directive, breach of the 
principles of subsidiarity, breach of the principle of legal certainty, breach of obligations 
in international law, breach of the fundamental right to respect for human dignity, and 
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breach of the procedural rules in the adoption of the Commission’s proposal.104 In 
rejecting the applicants’ submissions that Article 5(1) of the Directive, in providing for 
the patentability of isolated elements of the human body, undermined human dignity, the 
Court took note of its obligations to ensure respect within the EC for the fundamental 
right to human dignity and integrity, but found that Article 5(1) was framed in stringent 
enough terms to ensure that the human body is unavailable for patenting and inalienable 
and to safeguard human dignity. There was, the Court reasoned, a difference between the 
discovery of a DNA sequence or of an element of the human body, neither of which 
would, as such, be patentable under the Directive, and inventions combining one of these 
natural elements with a technical process or application. 
 
The Netherlands argued that Article 6(1) of the Directive infringes the principle of legal 
certainty on the grounds that it gives insufficient guidance and is too general and 
equivocal in determining whether there is an infringement of ordre public or morality. 
AG Jacob stated:  
 
It is common ground that this provision allows the administrative 
authorities and courts of the Member State a wide scope for maneuver 
in applying this exclusion. However that scope for maneuver is 
necessary to take account of the particular difficulties to which the use 
of certain patents may give rise in the social and cultural context of 
each Member State, a context which the national legislative, 
administrative and court authorities are better placed to understand 
than the Community authorities.105  
 
The Directive, therefore, does not infringe the principle of legal certainty because, 
among other things, the application by national authorities of the concepts of ordre 
public and morality will always be subject to review by the Court. Attention was also 
drawn to Article 6(2).106 The Court concluded that ‘as regards living matter of human 
origin, the Directive frames the law on patents in a manner sufficiently rigorous to 
ensure that the human body effectively remains unavailable and inalienable and that 
human dignity is thus safeguarded.107 Under the Netherlands reasoning Howard 
Florey/H2 Relaxin may be decided differently under the Biotechnology Directive.108  
 
The ECJ upheld the legality of the Directive, but opposition to the Directive was so 
fierce that despite losing the legal challenge, eight of the fifteen EU Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Sweden) 
had not incorporated the Directive into their national laws by the end of 2003,109 and 
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four were still out of compliance in early 2005.110 The Commission took action against 
Italy. 
 
ii. Commission v Italy 
 
The leading ECJ case on the interpretation of the illustrative list of exclusions in Article 
6(2) of the Directive describes the correct interpretative approach.111 In Commission v. 
Italy112 the ECJ ruled: 
 
Unlike Article 6(1) of the Directive, which allows the administrative 
authorities and courts of Member States a wide discretion in applying 
the general moral exclusion on inventions whose commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public and morality, Article 
6(2) allows Member States no discretion in the implementation of the 
specific exclusions, since the very purpose of this provision is to give 
definition to the exclusion laid down in Article 6(1).113  
 
The critical aspect of the ruling is the Court’s insistence that the test to be applied to the 
interpretation of the list of specific exclusions under Article 6(2) is definitional, not 
moral. The implication is that, when reading and interpreting the specific exclusion, the 
words have to be given their natural meaning. Additional words should not be imported 
to vary, broaden, or narrow the exclusion in order to instantiate the alleged underlying 
moral consensus since, as stated by the Court, the specific exclusion is already 
illustrative of the principle.114  
 
The specific list of exclusions, the ECJ reasoned, reflect the legislative consensus on 
inventions considered by the drafters to be morally unpatentable at the time.115 The 
wording of Article 6(2)(c) specifically excludes from patentability ‘uses of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’, not patents for inventions involving 
destruction of a human embryo. The fact that a wording precluding patents on 
uses/involving destruction of human embryos was not agreed upon at the time is both 
significant and not surprising in the light of the fact that the Directive was not intended 
to alter existing patent law116 and render unpatentable inventions based on activities 
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which were considered morally permissible and were lawful in Member States at the 
time.117 Supportive of this stance is the statement from Rothley118 (the rapporteur): 
 
In relation to the use of embryos, the Council has set some limitations: 
they are not to be used for industrial or commercial purposes. But I 
would only ask you to remember that this was done with the UK in 
mind. We cannot as European legislators decree that something which 
does not contravene the underlying legal principles of all Member 
States is a contravention of public order, and we cannot brand 
something that we do not jointly regard as abhorrent as a contravention 
to common decency. That is not acceptable.119 
 
When viewed in this light the legislative history of the provision may therefore actually 
constitute as yet a relevant aspect of the argumentation in favour of a narrow reading of 
Article 6(2)(c).120 An analysis of the drafting history of the Directive indicates that the 
drafters did not specifically consider the question of the patenting of hESC related 
inventions,121 and therefore how Articles 5, 6(1), and 6(2)(c) would be applied to hESC 
technology.122 This is despite the fact that there had been some mention of the 
hypothetical use of hESCs as the next progression from primate ESC research carried 
out from 1995 onwards.123 
 
 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF hESC TECHNOLOGY 
 
The first isolation of hESCs by Wisconsin biologist and inventor James Thomson was 
reported in November 1998, four months after the Directive’s adoption.124 Therefore, 
controversy over the patentability of hESCs in Europe emerged as the wording of Article 
6(2)(c) was thrown into question by rapid scientific advances.125 The first formal 
question to the Commission on the applicability of the Directive to hESC patents was 
posed on the 7th December 1998 by Doeke Eisma of the European Liberal Democratic 
and Reform Party.126 The written question requested that the Commission clarify 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 The UK had in force since 1990, the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, which 
permitted research involving destruction of human embryos. 
118 The 1997 Rothley “Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions”, COM (95) OJ C286/7. 
119 Debates of the European Parliament, May 1998. Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions. 
120 M Rowlandson, “WARF/Stem Cells (G2/06): the ordre public and morality exception and its 
impact on the patentability of human embryonic stem cells” EIPR 2010, 32:2, 67 at 72 
121 G Porter, supra note 8 at 24. 
122 G Porter et al, supra note 25. 
123 J Thomson et al, “Isolation of a Primate Embryonic Stem Cell Line” (1995) 92:17 Proc Nat’l 
Acad Sci USA. 7844. 
124 J Thomson et al, “Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts” (1998) 
Science 282, 1145. 
125 G Porter, supra note 8 at 26. 
126 Question No3668/98 “Applicability of the Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions to Human Research with Embryonic Tissue”, (1998) OJ C325/024.  
Vol 20 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 165 
whether Article 5 of the Directive would prohibit the patenting of the invention of a 
method of growing hESCs in a laboratory. The Commission’s reply, of 16 February 
1999, stated that although the patenting of hESC related technology might engage 
Articles 5 and 6(2)(c), it did not have jurisdiction over this particular question, and 
should the issue arise, it would be the patent offices of the Member States and the 
national judges before whom the matter was brought that would decide.127 In fact, it was 
not cases before national patent offices and courts, but rather patent applications at the 
EPO that would initially trigger debate on the patenting of hESCs.128  
 
i. The Edinburgh Patent 
 
The Edinburgh Patent129 application to the EPO ‘involved removing stem cells from 
human embryos, genetically manipulating these cells and cultivating genetically 
manipulated embryos from them’.130 The Examining Division granted the patent. There 
was opposition against the patent by the governments of Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands.131 In contrast to this opposition, a Report by the EGE132 concluded that 
there was no ethical obstacle to patentability attached to processes involving hESCs 
whatever their source.133 The Opposition Division, in one of the first decisions to 
consider the new provisions under Rule 23d(c), acknowledged there was no uniform 
approach with regard to hESCs reflected in legislation or in other conventionally 
accepted standards of conduct in European culture, and decided to maintain the patent 
with amended claims, including claims to stem cells per se, but with a disclaimer to 
human or animal embryonic stem cells removing same from the scope of the patent.  
 
The Opposition Division observed that the exclusion under Rule 23d(c) could be 
interpreted in either a narrow or a broad fashion.134 Under the narrow interpretation only 
commercial uses of embryos as such would be excluded from patentability. The broad 
interpretation would mean that patents would be precluded not only on industrial and 
commercial uses of human embryos, but also on hESCs retrieved by the destruction of 
human embryos, irrespective of whether the application discloses direct use of the 
human embryo or not. According to the Opposition Division, Rule 23d(c) had to be 
construed broadly. This was because embryos as such are already ‘protected’ by Rule 
23(e) (the equivalent of Article 5(1) of the Directive) and therefore interpreting Rule 
23d(c) in the same way as Rule 23(e) would result in redundancy that would undermine 
the intention of the legislator.135 In 2005, the President of the EPO suspended the issue 
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of new patents in respect of hESC technology because ‘there are too many ethical 
aspects that have not been resolved at the political level’.136  
 
Notwithstanding the amendment to the patent claims, Edinburgh still appealed. After a 
decade of legal battle, this longstanding appeal was withdrawn during oral proceedings 
before the EPO Board of Appeal in November 2007.137 The decision in Edinburgh is 
significant in terms of the moral provisions in European patent law as it is a clear 
departure from the EPO’s pre Directive ‘morality rulings’ where it held that exceptions 
to patentability must be interpreted narrowly.138 The decision set a precedent, which 




The application filed by WARF, based on research carried out by James Thomson,140 
concerned a method for obtaining embryonic stem cell cultures from a primate embryo 
as well as the cell cultures themselves.141 In 2004, the Examining Division held the 
claims that could be extended to hESCs must be rejected on the grounds of morality, as 
even though the isolated hESCs are not themselves ‘embryos’, hESCs cannot be 
obtained without an embryo’s prior destruction.142 WARF appealed the decision to the 
TBA and also requested that the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) should refer the issue 
of the interpretation of the Directive to the ECJ as it involved the application of EU 
law.143  
 
The TBA expressed doubts of the ethicality of approaching an Article 53(a) EPC 
assessment of hESC related inventions by means of applying the balancing test as set out 
in the Onco-Mouse decision.144 ‘The Board has doubts, whether, when it comes to 
human life, it would be ethically acceptable to make a decision be weighing the interests 
of human beings which could potentially benefit from the exploitations of the technology 
against a right, if any, of human embryos’.145   
In 2005, the TBA in accordance with Article 112(a) EPC referred a series of questions 
relating to the interpretation of Rule 23d(c) to the EBA. At the end of 2008, the EBA 
issued its eagerly awaited decision.146 The EBA refused WARF’s request to make a 
reference to the ECJ as there was a lack of any legal and institutional link between the 
EPO and the EU and there was no mechanism for making a reference to the Court. The 
ruling therefore distinguishes the EPO from the EU. The EPO sees itself as an 
international organization: in its view the EPC contracting states, not all of who are EU 
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Member States, cannot be presumed to have conferred jurisdiction to the ECJ.147 The 
EBA proceeded to consider the four questions referred by the TBA.148 
 
1. Did the prohibition in respect of biotechnological inventions concerning 
the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes apply 
retrospectively to applications filed before the implementation of the 
Directive into the EPC? 
 
2. If the answer to Question 1 was yes, did it make any difference to the 
validity of the application that the method involving the destruction of 
embryos did not form part of the claim? 
 
3. If the answer to Question 1 or 2 was no, did the prohibition under the EPC 
to inventions contrary to morality apply? 
 
4. In the context of Question 2 and 3, did it make any difference that after the 
filing date the products claimed could have been obtained without using the 
method that involved the destruction of human embryos? 
 
On assessing Question 1, the EBA noted that no transitional provisions were made when 
the Directive was implemented by the EPO and there was no indication that the 
commercial exploitation of embryos had previously been regarded as patentable. 
Therefore, the prohibition concerning the use of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes applied to all pending applications retrospectively.149 
 
For Question 2, the EBA noted that the aim of the implementing rules was to align the 
EPC with the Directive and that the Directive was to be used as a supplementary means 
of interpretation. As the invention described in the WARF application could be 
performed only by destroying human embryos, and the invention was of commercial and 
or industrial benefit, it clearly fell within the scope of the prohibition on using human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. The Board went on to turn down 
WARF’s argument that the legislative history of the provision indicated a narrowing of 
the provision given its amended wording. On the contrary, the Board argued that the 
legislator’s choice to lastly include the reference to industrial and commercial purposes 
does not evidence such narrowing. Instead of evidencing narrowing of the provision’s 
application, the Board relied upon the legislative history of Article 23d(c) in the course 
of arguing in favour of a broad interpretation of the reference to industrial or commercial 
purposes.150 Thus, the EBA concluded that the exception for inventions for therapeutic 
or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and useful to it did not 
apply, as the invention had to benefit the embryo itself, and this was not the case in the 
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Given that the answers to Question 1 and 2 were yes, the EBA decided it was not 
necessary to answer Question 3. With respect to Question 4, the EBA ruled the technical 
developments that became publicly available only after the filing date could not be taken 
into consideration. Therefore, it was irrelevant that after the filing date the same products 
could have been obtained without having to use the method that necessarily involved the 
destruction of human embryos.  
 
The EBA decision is potentially open to two interpretations. On a narrow interpretation 
of the ruling, drawing on the EBA’s concluding statement that the decision is confined to 
the facts of the case and not concerned with the patentability of hESCs in general, the 
exclusion would be restricted to inventions the practice of which involves direct 
destruction of human embryos in the practice of the invention.152 Patent protection for 
methods and for human stem cells per se based upon cells derived from existing cell 
lines would appear to be unaffected by the ruling.153 Given recent advances in stem cell 
technology, the ruling could not reasonably be extended to induced pluripotent stem 
cells, or to those methods of obtaining hESCs that do not require destruction of a viable 
embryo.154 A narrow interpretation of the EBA’s decision should therefore allow patents 
to be granted for hESC research where a stem cell bank rather than an embryo is 
identified in the patent as the source.155 Indeed, the Geron Corporation,156 the exclusive 
licensee of the WARF patents, commented that the EBA ruling should not adversely 
effect its patent applications relating to research performed using existing hESC lines 
available from stem cell banks.157 
 
On the broadest interpretation, the exclusion would reach to all downstream inventions 
based on the original ‘morally tainted’ inventions involving destructive use of human 
embryos.158 The broad interpretation is based upon three key elements.159 Firstly, the 
moral prohibition relates not to the act of patenting, but to the performing of the 
invention, which includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo) 
that has to be considered to contravene those concepts. The logical implication of this 
approach, which does indeed stand out as the most plausible, particularly in light of 
Article 38 of the Preamble, is that there must be an alignment between moral norms 
applied within patent law and the moral norms outside patent law, as implied by Recital 
39 of the Directive. The second element is the finding that the nature of the immoral act 
attending the invention is the destruction of human embryos. The third and final element 
is the conflation and collapse of the distinction between industrial and commercial uses 
of human embryos into the making of the invention. In response to the applicant’s 
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submission that some uses of embryos do not fit the categories of ‘industrial’ or 
‘commercial’, the EBA ruled that whilst the wording of the exclusion in Article 23d(c) 
alluded specifically to uses of embryos which are ‘industrial’ or ‘commercial’, and stated 
that making the claimed product remains commercial or industrial exploitation of the 
invention even where there is an intention to use that product for further research.160 
 
The EBA’s construction draws on EU sources such as the drafting history of the 
Directive and funding policy of the Commission under the Framework Programs 
excluding funding for research involving destructive use of human embryos to justify the 
scope of the exclusion.161 As the judgment of a supreme tribunal purporting to 
pronounce on European patent law, the EBA’s ruling is singularly isolationist and bereft 
of references to the interpretation and application of similar principles by other supreme 
courts, most notably in this instance, the ECJ.162 Looking to the broader backdrop of the 
EU legal order, a broad exclusionary approach to Article 23d(c) is arguably untenable as 
it brings into conflict moral exclusions on patents in the Directive with the moral 
parameters of existing legislative controls on the practice of inventions involving human 
embryos and hESCs outside patent law in other EU Directives and Regulations. Since 
2004, the use of human embryonic tissue in the context of inventions with a research 
purpose falls to be regulated by the Directive on Human Tissue and Cells.163 The 
Regulation on Advanced Therapies and Medicinal Products164 was specifically targeted 
at ‘Regenerative medicine’, i.e. the use of genes, cells, and tissues which are anticipated 
to offer huge therapeutic potential, notably diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
which are of high prevalence in an ageing population.165 Indeed, Recital 17 of the 
Biotechnology Directive is expressly aimed at encouraging the development of 
regenerative therapies. 
 
The analysis of EU legislation on advanced therapies indicates that the industrial and 
commercial exploitation of hESC and tissue based products in Europe is not only not 
prohibited, whether destructive of human embryos or not, but was considered by the EU 
legislator as conferring important potential economic and health benefits to citizens in 
Europe. The implications for patent law are critical, as the combined body of EU 
legislation on the licensing and marketing of medicinal products on human tissue and 
cells, including hESCs, clearly indicate that industrial and commercial uses of such 
products are subject to morally permissive regulatory controls.166 If the EBA’s 
construction of Article 23d(c) is correct, then there is a systemic conflict within EU law 
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between legislation which permits the conduct of activities involving destructive uses of 
human embryos, including product development on an industrial and commercial basis, 
yet precludes the grant of property rights on the related inventions as ‘immoral’. An 
interpretation introducing this level of conflict between patent law and national/EU laws 
outside patent law creates systemic incoherence and ultimately violates the principle of 
legal certainty. It also looks suspiciously like a subversion of Article 14 of the Preamble 
of the Biotechnology Directive.167 A better approach is to construe the scope of the rights 
granted and excluded on moral grounds in the Biotechnology Directive consistently with 
the moral consensus evidenced in the cognate EU legislation on moral exclusions, as 
well as jurisprudence of the ECJ on the Directive, thereby aligning moral controls within 
patent law with moral controls outside patent law and in this way achieve legal certainty 
whilst preserving the integrity of the EU legal order.168  
 
The EPO is not the only institution authorized to issue patents within Europe. National 
patent offices grant patents that are valid within their own national jurisdictions, and may 
offer an alternative route to obtaining protection.169  
 
 
V. THE PATENTABILITY OF hESCS AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
An overview of EU Member States reveals a patchwork of divergent regulatory policies 
towards to patenting of hESCs.170 There is, however, consensus among Member States, 
in view of the potentiality of totipotent hESCs, that such cells are not patentable because 
the human body at various stages of its formation and development cannot constitute 
patentable inventions under Article 5(1)171 of the Directive.172 In contrast, the picture 
across Europe is altogether different in regard to the patentability of pluripotent hESCs 
with contrasting approaches.173  
 
i. The United Kingdom 
 
The UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) is a patent office with a liberal approach 
towards hESC inventions. In 2009, the UKIPO revised its practice on hESCs to take 
account of the ruling in WARF.174 The revised practice introduces a new condition under 
which patents on pluripotent hESCs will be granted provided they satisfy the normal 
requirement for patentability and that ‘at the filing or priority date, the invention could 
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UKIPO policy was seemingly in response to recent judicial dicta in the English higher 
courts calling for an alignment of national patent law with EPO law.175  
 
Strictly, the wording of the restriction suffers from the same defect as the EBA ruling in 
WARF, in that it does not indicate clearly whether the exclusion applies only to 
inventions the practice of which necessitates direct use (involving destruction) of a 
human embryo, or whether the exclusion also reaches to downstream inventions 
involving, for instance, differentiation of established hESC lines whose original 
derivation necessitated destruction of a human embryo.176 In contrast to the EPO, the 
UKIPO practice hitherto has been to grant patents on downstream hESC derivatives.177 
A survey of stem cell patents granted in January 2009 shows that the UKIPO had 
granted just under 100 patents to both UK and non-UK residents and there were four 
times as many applications as grants.178 It has been noted that applicants have taken 
advantage of this more sympathetic forum.179 For example, one German company, 
Axiogenesis (Germany), has filed a hESC related patent application180 at the UKIPO in 




The Swedish Act on Ethics Review of Research Involving Humans182 sets up a 
mandatory system for pre-examination of research on humans by regional ethical 
committees. The institutional framework of research ethics review has a practical 
influence on the application of the patent morality clause by the Swedish Patent and 
Registration Office (SPRO) when examining patent applications. The SPRO has adopted 
the view that a patent application on subject matter resulting from research given 
permission after pre-ethical examination renders unnecessary further evaluation by the 
patent examiner from an ordre public or morality perspective. On the other hand, 
disapproved research is likely to be held unpatentable. This is an example of a 
functioning relationship between ethical legislation and the ethical provisions in patent 
law, ensuring coherence between permissible research and patentable subject matter. The 
practical application of this framework has also been confirmed in Sweden’s attitude 
towards the application of the embryo exclusion.183 The SPRO has granted a WARF 
patent concerning an invention consisting of a method for differentiation of hESCs into 
hematopoetic cells.184 When granting this patent the subject of whether such claims 
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complied with the Swedish Patent Act, s1.c.3 (the implementation of Article 6(2)(c)) 
was considered. The conclusion was that it did, for the following reasons:  
 
To produce hESCs, human embryos are required. However, the 
present method does not require that the stem cells need to be 
produced from embryos as a consequence of the invention, since the 
method can be performed using already existing (deposited) stem 
cells.185  
 
Thus, the Swedish view was that the commercial exploitation of this method does not 
need the use of a human embryo - the stem cells may have been isolated long before the 
invention was made. The object of the provision in Article 6(2)(c) was to avoid a 
repetitive use of the humans or parts of humans such as embryos, thus leading to an 
instrumentation of humans/embryos. This invention is not directly linked to the use of an 
embryo and moreover does not repeatedly need human embryos. Accordingly, the 
Swedish concept of morality did not hinder the grant of the WARF patent.186 The 




The German Patents Act contains, in s.2, the morality clause as well as the exemplifying 
list.188 According to the last sentence of s.2, relevant provisions of the Embryo 
Protection Act (EPA) are applicable to s.2(2) 1-3 of the Patents Act, including the 
embryo exclusion. The EPA189 regulates the use of reproduction technology and the 
handling of human embryos in Germany. The reference establishes a connection 
between the strict regulations in the EPA and the relevant exclusions in the Patents 
Act.190 
 
The EPA prohibits the disposal of, hand over, acquire, or use of a human embryo 
produced outside the human body with a purpose not serving its preservation, 
notwithstanding how the embryo was extracted.191 S.2(2) further prohibits the 
development of a human embryo outside the body for any purpose other than assisted 
reproduction. The Act establishes an absolute ban on embryo-consuming techniques and 
consequently also on the production of hESCs and stem cell lines.192 The creation of 
embryos for research purposes, and the use of supernumerary IVF embryos for research 
are strictly forbidden. The strict provisions of the EPA limit the possible industrial, 
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commercial, therapeutic or diagnostic uses of human embryos in Germany to an absolute 
minimum.193  
 
hESCs in general do not literally fall under the provisions of the EPA, since this Act 
specifically regulates the uses of human embryos. The definition of a human embryo is 
found in s.8 of the Act, and is based upon the capability of the material to develop into a 
human being. With this decisive factor not only embryos are covered by the scope of the 
Act, but also totipotent cells. An e contrario interpretation of the definition would 
exclude pluripotent cells from its range, arriving at the conclusion that the handling of 
and research on pluripotent hESCs as such is not prohibited by the Act. It therefore 
remains unclear to what extent the patenting of pluripotent hESCs per se is possible in 
Germany. Ultimately it will be a matter for the courts to decide.194  
 
The legal situation becomes more complicated when considering other relevant 
legislation. Even though it is impossible to establish hESC lines in Germany due to the 
EPA, ongoing research on hESC lines is in fact conducted within the Federal Republic. 
This apparent legal and practical contradiction is possible because the Stem Cell Act 
2002 permits the importation of externally established stem cell lines into Germany.195 
The term ‘embryonic stem cells’ is defined in the Stem Cell Act as ‘pluripotent stem 
cells derived from embryos’.196 It has been argued that the patenting of hESC lines 
produced outside Germany, lines derived from them, or modifications of both of these, if 
imported legally and in compliance with the Stem Cell Act, would be at least 
theoretically possible, because the decisive ground for the prohibition of patenting does 
not apply in these cases.197 This situation, however, overlooks the impact of the 
reference from the Patents Act to the EPA. The latter is used to limit the patentable area 
and to interpret the embryo exclusion and, in that sense, the origin of the material should 
be of a subordinate nature. The patenting of inventions involving hESCs is in fact 
dependent on the invention in question and whether the use of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes is required for the exploitation of the invention, and 
not on the origin of the cells.198 This has also been the position of a recent court decision.  
 
In 2006, the German Federal Patent Court199 (GFPC) gave judgment in Brüstle v 
Greenpeace200 relating to biotechnological research undertaken by the German 
neuroscientist Dr. Oliver Brustle. In 1999, the German Patent Office granted Brüstle a 
national patent that claims the use of hESCs for the treatment of neural deficiencies such 
as Parkinson’s disease and Multiple Sclerosis.201 The Examining Division of the EPO 
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also granted, in 2006, a European patent on hESC derivatives to Brüstle.202 The claims of 
the European patent are indistinguishable from the national patent except for a 
qualification that has been inserted throughout the claims stating that the procedures do 
not involve the destruction of human embryos.203 Greenpeace brought nullity 
proceedings against the national patent asserting that it was against public order and 
morality arguing the fact that the stem cells had been long cultivated outside the human 
body is irrelevant: at the beginning of the chain an embryo had to be killed to harvest the 
cells. Greenpeace stated that human life starts with the fusion of sperm and ovum, and 
blastocysts are embryos in the sense of the law. Brüstle counters that in the patent claims 
the use of stem cell lines which were harvested from blastocysts 4-5 days after 
fertilization, and therefore before the blastocyst can be rightfully called an embryo.  
 
The GFPC invalidated the national patent as contrary to Article 6(2)(c) notwithstanding 
the grant of the European patent only six months earlier.204 According to the GFPC, it 
did not matter whether the cells in the application were pluripotent or totipotent, since 
the invention necessitated the use (by destruction) of the human embryos, although none 
of the claims related to the production of ESC from human embryos but only 
encompassed hESCs that were readily available from existing cell lines. According to 
the GFPC, the patent did not reveal any other ways of using the invention, which did not 
lead to the destruction of human embryos.205 The decision seems to pay less attention to 
the origin of the stem cells than to the technical teaching of the invention and the 
characteristics of the subject matter involved. 
 
If this decision is upheld it would make a strong argument that the origin of the material 
has no impact on the patentability of hESC inventions in Germany, despite the 
distinction made in the applicable legislation with respect to the origin of the stem 
cells.206 The reasoning of the Court is in line with the approach adopted thus far by the 
EPO decisions in both Edinburgh and WARF, focusing on the making of the claimed 
product as an integral part of the invention.207 It is debatable whether such an enquiry 
should be part of the examination.208 As the ECJ noted in the Netherlands case, the 
Directive ‘concerns only the grant of patents and whose scope does not therefore extend 
to activities before and after that grant, whether they involve research or the use of the 
patented products’.209 
 
Dr. Brüstle is appealing against the GFPC ruling in the national courts, and because of 
the potential Constitutional issues raised by the case, on 21 January 2010 the German 
Supreme Court referred to the ECJ questions regarding the interpretation of Article 
6(2)(c) of Directive. From the perspective of EU law, on the natural reading of Article 
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6(2)(c), the Brüstle patent would not involve a violation of Article 6(2)(c) since the 
claims are not to industrial and commercial uses of human embryos.210 The ECJ will 
ultimately have to determine whether Germany may refuse patent protection to hESC 
inventions under Article 6(1) in recognition of fundamental principles of the German 
Constitution.211 In addition, the ECJ will now have to rule on the interpretation of 
‘human embryo’ in the sense of Article 6(2)(c). Is a stem cell derived from a blastocyst, 
which has lost its ability to develop into a human still an embryo? If so, is a blastocyst a 
human embryo? If so, is purely therapeutic use of stem cells a ‘commercial or industrial 
purpose’ in the sense of Article 6? The ruling could make or break biotechnology patent 
applications claiming the use of hESCs with ramifications for the biotechnology industry 
in Europe.212 In the increasingly complex European patent map, the corresponding 
European Brüstle patent is being opposed at the EPO by the Geron Corporation.213 The 
question now arises as to whether the European Brüstle patent is consistent with the 
EBA ruling within the EPC. On a ‘narrow’ reading of the EBA’s WARF ruling, the 
Brüstle application could conceivably be distinguished from the WARF application on 
the grounds that the claims to the isolation and differentiation of the neuroprogenitor 
cells do not involve destruction of a human embryo, as repeated throughout the 
European application.214  
 
 
VI. THE PATENTING OF hESCS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate 
‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ 
The First Congress enacted the Patent Act 1790 that, in addition to novelty, required the 
invention to be ‘sufficiently useful and important’.215 The relevant legislative history of 
the second U.S. Patent Act, the Patent Act of 1793, supports a broad construction of 
patent law, defining statutory subject matter as ‘any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof’. The 
Act embodied Thomas Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement’.216 In 1952, when patent laws where re-codified, Congress replaced the 
word ‘art’ with ‘process’ in Title 35 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) s101, but otherwise left 
Jefferson’s language intact.217 Today, Title 35 U.S.C. s101 of the Patent Act 1952 still 
governs U.S. patent law. This is not to suggest that s101 has no limits or that it embraces 
every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
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categories of subject matter outside of s101. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’.218 The four classes of statutory 
subject matter (i.e. any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter) under s101 
are flexible, with the U.S. Supreme Court, in Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp,219 
asserting that patent law was an evolving legal science designed to cover all emerging 
technologies.220  
 
i. The Link Between Utility and Morality 
 
Courts in the U.S. were often willing to withhold patents for inventions they considered 
immoral, such as inventions used to defraud buyers and machines used for gambling. 
Although U.S. patent law has no morality clause per se, because moral norms were often 
enforced in the courts by means of the utility requirement, the link between ‘utility’ and 
‘morality’ is important.221 The U.S. concept of utility is both broader and narrower than 
the notion of industrial application under the EPC.222 It is a broader concept in that the 
same word encompasses elements such as morality and illegality. It is narrower in that 
pure research is not held to equal a practical utility.223  
 
The principle of utility was judicially laid down in the 1817 decision of Justice Story in 
Lowell v Lewis.224 In that decision, he explained that ‘all that the law requires is that the 
invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society. The word ‘useful’, therefore, is incorporated into the Act225 in 
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral’.226 Unfortunately, however, Justice Story 
could not have anticipated the wonders of modern science.227 
 
ii. Diamond v Chakrabarty – U.S. Patent Liberalization 
 
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty228 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title 35 U.S.C. s101 is 
to be interpreted broadly due to the deliberate use of ‘any’ in conjunction with expansive 
terms such as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ found in the provision. The 
decision, taking into consideration the legislative intention of Congress under the 1952 
Act,229 has been widely interpreted to hold that ‘anything under the sun that is made by 
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man’ is patentable.230 The Court gave a green light to biotech researchers and investors 
by confirming that ‘life’ can comprise patent-eligible subject matter. Acknowledging the 
possible repercussions of its decision, the Court noted the ‘gruesome parade of horribles’ 
identified by the USPTO and amici as potentially resulting from biotechnology patents. 
The Court, however, declared itself to be ‘without competence’ even to entertain such 
morality-laden ‘high policy’ arguments. In broadly construing s101, the Court identified 
its role as ‘the narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in 
the statute; once that is done, our powers are exhausted.’231  
 
Consequently, the s101 subject matter prong of patent eligibility does not provide a bar 
to the patenting of morally controversial biotech subject matter.232 The Chakrabarty 
decision is important in appreciating the Courts emphasis on limiting judicially created 
exceptions to patentable subject matter under s101.233 As a result living biological 
materials have been patented in the U.S. 
 
Shortly after the Chakrabarty decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) was created to promote greater uniformity in the application of U.S. patent law, 
and to reduce the possibility of forum shopping by parties seeking favorable courts.234 
The CAFC now has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in patent cases. From its 
creation, the CAFC has been decidedly ‘pro-patent’. The CAFC has provided much 
needed clarification of standards for interpreting patent rights and increased 
predictability in the application of patent laws. Clearly, such a development is welcome. 
By contrast, because the EPO is not an EU institution, legislative reform of this nature is 
not possible.235 
 
iii. Property in Human Beings and the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
The USPTO in response to the Board of Patent Appeals Ex Parte Allen236 decision 
regarding the patenting of multi-cellular animals, issued a notice stating explicitly that it 
considered ‘a claim directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be 
considered to be patentable subject matter under s101. The grant of a limited, but 
exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.’237 This 
Constitutional reference was to the prohibition of slavery under the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, which states that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the U.S., or any place subject to their jurisdiction.’238 
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Bagley suggests Roe v. Wade239 holds that at their earliest stages of development, 
embryos are not constitutionally protected as ‘persons.’240 This holding suggests that, at 
a minimum, the Thirteenth Amendment would not bar patents on human embryos.241  
 
Whilst the USPTO’s response to Ex Parte Allen clarified its position regarding the 
patenting of non-human multi-cellular organisms, it did nothing to reconcile its treatment 
of ‘isolated human biological material’ with that of ‘human beings’. This weakness was 
exploited when, in 1997, Jeremy Rifkin, a prominent opponent of biotechnology, and Dr. 
Stuart Newman, a cellular biologist at New York Medical College, filed a patent 
application covering the production of human-animal chimeras by inserting the genetic 
material from one species into an embryo of another to create, in effect, ‘human-animal’ 
chimeras.242 The objective in filing the application was to ‘raise these ethical issues 
before the public and the legal system in a particularly dramatic fashion.’243 Because 
Newman had failed to place limits on the percentage of human cells in the invention, the 
USPTO found that the invention could embrace a human being and issued a rejection of 
the patent in 1999.244 In a media advisory released in response to the public outcry 
associated with the Newman application, the USPTO relied on the moral utility doctrine 
stating that the Newman chimeras could not be patentable because they would fail to 
meet the public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.’245 The Newman-
Rifkin patent application represents an instance where, arguably, the USPTO asked 
morality questions first, but lacked the authority to do so.246  By issuing the press release, 
the USPTO showed that it is willing to continue to rely on Justice Story’s formulation of 
utility in Lowell v Lewis. The Newman application suggests the link between ‘utility’ 
and ‘morality’ is especially relevant for modern biotechnological inventions.247  
 
iv. Rejection of the Doctrine of Moral Utility 
 
The reference by the USPTO to the moral utility doctrine is curious for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, when releasing ‘Utility Guidelines’ in 1998, the USPTO Commissioner 
stated that ‘if an applicant presents a scientifically plausible use for the claimed 
invention, it will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement.’248 This is in line with 
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the 1952 Act,249 which provides that a person is entitled to a patent if his or her invention 
meets the statutory patentability requirements specified in the Act.250 Secondly, the 2001 
Examination Guidelines for the Utility Requirement make no mention of morality or, 
indeed, public policy issues.251 Thirdly, the decision in Juicy Whip Inc. v Orange Bang 
Inc252 explicitly sounded the death-knell for the moral utility requirement.253 Thus, a 
combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with the expansive judicial 
interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has resulted in virtually no 
basis on which the USPTO or courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, 
but otherwise patentable, subject matter.254  
 
In 2001, in contrast to Europe, the USPTO granted the equivalent WARF patent based on 
the same claims and work carried out by James Thomson.255 By 2004, a number of 
patents had been issued with claims to hESC products or processes.256 For example, the 
patent issued to the Geron Corporation for ‘methods and materials for the growth of 
primate-derived primordial stem cells in feeder-free culture’257 claims a cellular 
composition comprising undifferentiated primate primordial stem cells, which includes 
both pluripotent and totipotent primate stem cells, but does not exclude human primate 
stem cells. It appears then that, in the U.S., human pluripotent and totipotent stem cells 
are patentable, despite the fact that human beings at any stage of development are not 
patentable.258 By 2006, the USPTO had granted in excess of forty-one patents that claim 
hESCs in their title and front pages.259 These include patents on culture methods, 
differentiated cells derived from hESCs and even hESCs per se.260 Indeed the Geron 
Corporation has recently announced that it has received clearance from the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration to begin the world’s first human clinical trial of hESC based 
therapy for patients with acute spinal cord injury.261 
 
v. The Full Frontal Attack on Biotechnology Patents 
 
In Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v USPTO et al., (Myriad)262 a U.S. District 
Court Judge recently struck down seven patents related to two genes linked to breast and 
ovarian cancer. The decision, if upheld, could throw into doubt patents covering 
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thousands of human genes and reshape the law of intellectual property in the U.S.263 In 
his opinion,264 Sweet J., noting the Supreme Court judgment in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, stated this broad reading of 35 U.S.C. s.101 and statutory patent eligibility 
is not without limits. Sweet J. agreed with the plaintiff’s basic argument that the 
‘isolated’ DNA that Myriad claimed to have patented is still a product of nature, and 
cannot be covered by patents. If upheld in the event of an appeal, the USPTO will need 
to make sure its practices conform to the decision, and avoid issuing patents related to 
isolated DNA. That leaves a big ‘if,’ considering that the next level, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is a court that is considered patent-friendly and likely to 
reject, or at least narrow, such a broad challenge to gene patents.265  
 
With a final resolution to Myriad likely several years away, a variety of other legal 
developments are slowly but surely reshaping the biotechnology patent landscape in the 
U.S.266 A perfect example of this is the decision of April 28 2010 by the Board of Patent 
Appeals of the USPTO to invalidate one267 of WARF’s patents on stem cell cultures.268 
This archetypal example of a ‘broad patent’ on hESCs raised criticism of market abuse 
and was the subject of an unsuccessful review following a challenge brought by the 
Foundation Taxpayer and Consumer Rights and the Public Patent Foundation.269 The 
challenge to the WARF patent is particularly noteworthy in that the motivation was 
undoubtedly ‘moral’ and driven by concerns that the USPTO had been overgenerous in 
granting the patent. But, crucially, the challenge did not take place in the realm of 
morality, but was focused instead on the USPTO’s application of the technical criteria of 
novelty and inventive step/non-obviousness.270 The Board ruled that the WARF claims 
were anticipated by a 1992 patent and were obvious in light of ‘significant guideposts’ in 
the prior art. After some additional USPTO proceedings, there may be an appeal to the 
Federal Circuit. 
 
vi. Reinstatement of Federal Funding for hESC Research 
 
In March 2009, President Barrack Obama, in one of his first Executive Orders271 
reversed the Bush era ethics-driven ban on U.S. federal funding for hESC research.272 
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President Obama stated that ‘the purpose of this order is to remove limitations on 
scientific inquiry, to expand support for the exploration of human stem cell research, and 
in so doing to enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new 
discoveries and new therapies for the benefit of humankind.’273 This is good news for 
anyone hoping for a cure for spinal cord injuries and degenerative diseases,274 but not for 





The Commission’s aim of establishing a consistent and unified approach towards the 
patenting of biotechnological inventions within Europe has not been achieved. The 
inconsistent application of the moral exclusion clause under the Biotechnology Directive 
has lead to legal uncertainty surrounding biotechnology inventions claiming hESCs 
within Europe. The uncertainty lies in the absence of a common European morality and a 
uniform legal definition of the human embryo. To add to this uncertainty, patent 
protection in Europe operates on three levels with differing institutional connections – 
the EPO, the EU, and the national states.276  Whilst the ECJ is the court vested with 
supreme authority over the interpretation of the Directive, the fragmented institutional 
framework in Europe on the examination and grant of European patents and the post-
grant determination of their validity, means the whilst the EPO acts as a first filter on 
European patents, the legal validity of the patent is subject to review in the national 
courts.277 The biggest hurdle to achieving true European integration in patent protection 
is the absence of a centralized litigation system with a single judicial body able to rule 
definitely on the validity and infringements of European patents. The co-existence of a 
plethora of national enforcement mechanisms is not only extremely costly and lengthy 
but leads to forum shopping, complex cross-border litigation and considerable legal 
uncertainty. There is support for the establishment of a European Patent Court with a 
Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal similar to that in the U.S.278  
 
Given that a European Patent Court is a long way off, the EPO, who does not have the 
legitimacy to act as an arbiter of European morality, must consider the U.S. model of 
patenting first and asking questions later. A return to the ‘public abhorrence’ test set out 
in Howard Florey, invoking the moral exclusion in rare circumstances, would provide a 
greater degree of legal certainty for biotechnological inventions within Europe. Article 
6(1) may constitute the legal basis for a Member State to invalidate a patent once it is 
transformed into a national patent if their view upon the human embryo dictates such 
action. It seems even more appropriate to allow each Member State decide upon whether 
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or not the destruction of the human embryo constitutes a valid criterion in regard to the 
application of Article 6(2)(c).279  
 
The decision in WARF has added to the uncertainty surrounding the moral exclusion in 
Europe.280 It is a missed opportunity to clarify the law regarding the patentability of 
hESCs within Europe and therefore also a missed opportunity to restore the legal 
credibility of the EPO who will eventually have to decide upon the issue of patents 
claiming hESC lines and new technology for extracting hESCs without destroying the 
embryo.281 The incentive offered by U.S. patent law is particularly important for 
biotechnology inventions.282 The past success of its patent system is a direct result of its 
ability to evolve and adapt to changing times and new technologies as they arise.283  This 
has the effect of giving international corporations an additional incentive to seek 
protection first in the U.S. where morality is not a factor.284 Now that the U.S. has started 
to dismantle its barriers to investment in hESC research, Europe needs to get its act 
together, and quickly, as the inconsistent application of the Biotechnology Directive’s 
moral exclusion clause could undermine investor confidence in Europe, providing a 
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